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Abstract
In this paper we concentrate on the question whether the ﬁnancing struc-
ture of the health care systems converges. In a world of increasing
economic integration convergence in health care ﬁnancing (HCF) and,
hence, decreasing diﬀerences in HCF across countries enhance individ-
uals’ (labour) mobility and support harmonization processes. As an
indicator for convergence we take the public ﬁnancing ratio in % of to-
tal HCF and in % of GDP. The major ﬁnding is that HCF in the OECD
countries converged in the time period 1970 – 2005. This conlusion also
holds when looking at smaller sub groups of countries and shorter time
periods. However, we ﬁnd evidence that countries do not move towards
a common mean and that the rate of convergence is decreasing over
time.
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11 Introduction
For many years the ‘nation states’1 were able to establish and con-
serve fairly idiosyncratic institutional designs and policy cultures in the
health care sector. In the last two decades, the co-occurrence of socio-
demographic, economic and institutional changes has reduced the capac-
ity of the nation states for an autonomous health care policy, leading to
a convergence in the health care systems.
In contrast to previous literature which mainly examines the expendi-
ture side of the health care system we focus on the ﬁnancing side and its
inherent collection of revenues. Our research question deals with to the
convergence/divergence in ﬁnancing structures – deﬁned as the public-
private ﬁnancing mix – in the health care systems in the OECD-countries.
Using the concepts of σ-convergence (measured as coeﬃcient of variation)
and absolute and conditional β-convergence we analyse whether (private-
public) ﬁnancing converged or diverged in the time period 1970-2005.
Hence, besides our analysis of the hitherto neglected ﬁnancing side we
contribute to the existing literature by focusing on a long-run perspective
(36 years) and a broad sample of 23 countries. The data enable us to
examine convergence patterns for diﬀerent sub samples (with respect to
their health care system) and time periods.
Our results indicate that the health ﬁnancing structure converged in
this time period. In particular, the country eﬀects included (country
speciﬁc characteristics and country dummies) indicate that states do not
move toward a common mean. We also ﬁnd evidence that the rate of
convergence decreases over time. These results are robust with regard
to diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the dependent variable, to diﬀerent methods
of testing for convergence, to diﬀerent assignments of countries to sub
samples, and to the time frame chosen.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief
discussion of previous literature on convergence in the health care sector.
In section 3 we present the methodological framework, indicators, and
data used in the paper. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Con-
1When we use the term ‘nation state’ we just use it as a borderline to other states.
We are aware of the fact that the internal potential of the ‘nation state’ to steer the
health care sector is quite limited. For a very illustrative discussion of this topic see
Immergut (1990).
2cluding remarks and suggestions for future research are oﬀered in the last
section.
2 Previous Research
Our research question falls into the broader range of studies which focus
on the convergence in health care systems. Overall, this literature reveals
a rather heterogeneous picture. Several authors identify a trend toward
convergence (Nixon 2000, Hitiris & Nixon 2001), others ﬁnd no signs for
convergence at all (Globerman & Vining 1998, Montero-Granados, De
Dios Jimenez & Martin 2007), while the third strand of authors draws
a mixed picture (Saltman 1997, Wendt, Grimmeisen & Rothgang 2005),
ﬁnding convergence for some and divergence for other indicators. To
some extent, this heterogeneity arises from methodological diﬀerences
in the study designs. In this respect we have to separate at least the
following diﬀerent approaches.
(i) Based on the unit of analysis we can separate between intra-state
studies and international comparisons of health care systems, the latter
being far more frequent. There exist two recent intra-state studies: Wang
(2009) examines convergence in real per capita health expenditures in
the 50 US states over the period 1980-2004 and Montero-Granados et al.
(2007) analyze the convergence/divergence in the health status in Spain
on a provincial and regional level.
(ii) Depending on the indicator of convergence studies can be clas-
siﬁed into multidimensional and single-dimensional studies. Within the
former a three-dimensional concept of the health care system dominates.
It includes the dimensions ﬁnancing, regulation and service provision
(see for example Wendt et al. 2005). This structure allows the authors
to analyse simultaneously the ﬁnancing mix, the provision mix and the
extent of state regulation in ﬁnancing and provision and therefore en-
ables statements on the overall convergence in the health care systems.
So far, studies of this type have been characterized by (very) small sam-
ple sizes (see for example Aldridge & Sundarapandiyan 1995, Glober-
man & Vining 1998, Globerman, Hodges & Vining 2001). The major-
ity of the studies on convergence are single-dimensional thereby prefer-
ring health expenditures – either per capita or as a ratio to GDP, as
3a whole or split into its major components (public vs. private, inpa-
tient vs. outpatient) – as indicators of convergence/divergence (Comas-
Herrera 1999, Nixon 1999, Nixon 2000, Hitiris & Nixon 2001, Dreger &
Reimers 2005, Kerem, Puss & Maldre 2008).2 Studies on convergence in
the ﬁnancing structure (e.g. private vs. public) of the health care sector
are missing.3
(iii) The methods applied for testing convergence allow for a third
classiﬁcation of previous literature. The ﬁrst type of studies is heav-
ily inﬂuenced by the convergence hypothesis derived from the neoclas-
sical growth theory and uses the concepts of σ-convergence and abso-
lute and conditional β-convergence. Initially, this concept was based on
cross-section data, in recent studies this approach was also applied to
panel data sets and methods (Nixon 2000, Hitiris & Nixon 2001, Sanz
& Vel´ azquez 2004, Kerem et al. 2008). The second strand of literature
is based on time series analyses.4 These studies deﬁne convergence as
transitory deviations from identical long-run trends, either determinis-
tic or stochastic. Several empirical studies follow this approach high-
lighting diﬀerent aspects of the convergence topic (Comas-Herrera 1999,
Narayan 2007, Narayan & Narayan 2008, Wang 2009). A third strand of
literature analyses convergence implicitly by using diﬀerent methodolog-
ical approaches. For example, Alcalde-Unzu, Ezcurra & Pascual (2009)
present a factor decomposition of the diﬀerences in health expenditure
growth. Okunade & Suraratdecha (2006) examine the inertia of pharma-
ceutical expenditures. Clemente, Marcuello, Monta˜ nes & Pueyo (2004)
focus on the diﬀerences in the expenditure functions of the private and
public health care sector.
(iv) Last but not least, insights into the convergence hypothesis in the
health care system can also be gained from studies which focus on the
broader perspective of convergence in the welfare state. It is the merit of
2Some studies focus on the outcome indicator health status. For example, Mayer-
Foulkes (2001) asks whether there are convergence clubs in cross country life ex-
pectancy dynamics.
3Due to the ﬁnancing-expenditure link the split into public and private expendi-
tures also oﬀers insights into the public-private ﬁnancing structure.
4For the discussion of testing convergence using cross-section or time series data
and methods see Bernard & Durlauf (1994). For the closely related problem of sta-
tionarity of health care expenditures and their determinants see for example Hansen
& King (1996), McCoskey & Selden (1998), Gerdtham & L¨ othgren (2000), Okunade
& Karakus (2001), MacDonald & Hopkins (2002), Dreger & Reimers (2005).
4these studies to stress the importance of the institutional design of the
welfare state for the impact of internal and international changes and
shocks for convergence/divergence (see Pierson 2000, Wolf 2002, Corrado,
Londo˜ no B., Mennini & Trovato 2003, Kim & Zurlo 2008). This aspect is
crucial as the convergence studies – especially those which use time series
methods – are to a high extent a-institutional. One therefore is tempted
to conclude that the inexorable nature of health expenditure (ﬁnancing)
is beyond the reach of policy.
3 Empirical framework
3.1 Motivation
Within the health care system health care ﬁnancing (HCF) fulﬁlls dif-
ferent functions (Busse, Schrey¨ ogg & Gericke 2007): (i) Collecting rev-
enues, (ii) pooling revenues (risks) and (iii) purchasing services. These
three tasks can be uniﬁed in one organisational entity or can be split up
between diﬀerent institutions.
The collecting stage is important for several reasons: (i) Public and
private ﬁnancing may have diﬀerent eﬀects on equity of ﬁnancing, health
care utilization and health status (see Wagstaﬀ & van Doorslaer 2000, van
Doorslaer, Koolman & Jones 2004). (ii) Diﬀerent degrees of risk pooling
and risk reduction are associated with this dichotomy. While out-of-
pocket (OOP) payments do not include risk pooling at all and private
health insurance only reduces the health expenditure risks, public ﬁnanc-
ing via taxes or income-based contributions also includes some element
of reducing the income risk. Hence, the risk spectrum covered by pub-
lic ﬁnancing is broader compared to private ﬁnancing. (iii) In a nor-
mative perspective speciﬁc forms of collecting (e.g. public insurance)
are able to reduce market failures in the coverage of health care risks
(for a detailed discussion see Hurley 2000). (iv) Finally, there exists
a link between the ﬁnancing structure and the eﬃciency in the provi-
sion of health care services (see Propper & Green 1999, Globerman &
Vining 1998, Glied 2008a, Glied 2008b). This link includes much more
than the well known moral hazard phenomenon.
5Why should one study the convergence of the collecting stage? Even
without stressing the convergence issue its economic signiﬁcance men-
tioned above turns this stage of ﬁnancing into a rewarding object of
economic analysis.
In a world of increasing economic integration the similarity of health
care ﬁnancing between countries is worth investigating on its own. The
convergence across countries enhances the mobility in the labour market
and cross border shopping within the health care sector. Furthermore,
convergence in HCF reduces the incentive and beneﬁt to follow the out-
side option. By studying the (conditional) convergence we additionally
learn about the determinants of the public-private share. Understanding
the patterns and drivers of the adaption processes could help to answer
questions such as what future ﬁnancing systems will look like and whether
there exists something like a ‘best response’ to the ﬁnancing challenge.
3.2 Dependent variables
Our dependent variables refer to the public-private dimension of ﬁnanc-
ing.Basically, public funding means that there exists a degree of transfer
between the individual contribution and the coverage oﬀered. Therefore,
the collecting institutions are endowed with coercive power (for details
see OECD 2000). Public HCF is based on two sources: (i) general tax-
ation and (ii) contributions to social health insurance. Private ﬁnancing
includes (i) contributions to private health insurance5 and (ii) direct ﬁ-
nancing by private households such as OOP-spending for services and
diﬀerent types of cost-sharing.
To examine convergence in public-private HCF we use two diﬀerent
dependent variables. The ﬁrst indicator refers to public ﬁnancing in %
of total HCF (public), the second variable represents public ﬁnancing in
% of GDP (publicgdp).
5Private health insurance can oﬀer primary, duplicate, complementary and sup-
plementary coverage. For a detailed discussion of these diﬀerent functions see OECD
(2004).
63.3 Explanatory variables
The public-private-ratios are not only an instrument of health care pol-
icy but they also picture the private behaviour in the health care sector
including the private reactions to changes in the health care policy. Con-
sequently, we have to use a perspective which is able to explain the joint
allocation of resources to the public and private sectors of the health
care system. Gouveia (1996) oﬀers such an approach. According to the
author’s results private and public expenditures are determined by the
distribution of individual characteristics (e.g. morbidity risk distribu-
tion, income) and institutional features (ﬁnancing structure in the pub-
lic sector, decision rule in the public sector, shape of private insurance
contracts, etc.). Which implications can be drawn for the convergence in
HCF from this perspective?
We expect that the public ratio of ﬁnancing is the same for diﬀerent
countries only if the distribution of individual characteristics and pref-
erences and the institutional features are the same across all countries.
Only in this extreme case the steady state in the ﬁnancing ratio is ex-
pected to be the same for all countries. If, under these assumptions,
diﬀerences in the ﬁnancing ratio are observable these can only result
from institutional rigidities or path dependences after previous shocks.
If the institutional design of the ﬁnancing system diﬀers between the
countries similar changes in the individual characteristics may have dif-
ferent eﬀects on the ﬁnancing ratio. The variations in these eﬀects are
intensiﬁed if cross country diﬀerences in the ﬁnancing systems as well as
individual characteristics coincide. In a nutshell, this may lead to con-
vergence clubs and not to a general convergence (Kim & Zurlo 2008).
In summarizing these arguments we conclude that the concept of con-
ditional β-convergence seems to be a more appropriate approach. We
take these considerations into account by controlling for the following
characteristics:
• Public health insurance coverage (publiccov): We expect a positive
relationship between the proportion of the population with public
health insurance coverage and the public ratio in ﬁnancing. The
increase of this proportion includes a crowding out eﬀect of pri-
vate ﬁnancing, especially when the two insurance opportunities are
7substitutes. In addition, at least in health care systems of the so-
cial health insurance (SHI) type, public health insurance coverage
broadens the basis of public ﬁnancing.
• Demographic burden (elderly): All health care systems face an
increasing burden due to the increase of life expectancy and the
shifting in the proportion of the diﬀerent generations. The eﬀect
of changes in the demographic burden on the public ﬁnancing ratio
depends on the institutional design of the health care system. We
expect that an increasing number of elderly people positively in-
ﬂuences the public ﬁnancing ratio, as a rising demographic burden
intensiﬁes the need for intergenerational redistribution. Intergener-
ational redistribution is more likely to be assured by public ﬁnanc-
ing. We control for these eﬀects by including a variable capturing
the proportion of a country’s population older than 65 years.
• Openness of the economy (openc): We address the impact of an in-
creasing openness of the economy and, hence, increasing economic
interdependence on the convergence in the public ﬁnancing ratio. In
this context there are two diﬀerent strands of arguments in favour
of convergence in HCF but at diﬀerent levels. On the one hand
the ‘compensation hypothesis’ claims that the emerging interna-
tionalization of economies leads to an increasing demand for public
assistance to cover social risks (Kim & Zurlo 2008). On the other
hand the ‘race to the bottom hypothesis’ claims a downsizing of
the public institutions for social assistance to their eﬃcient level or
even to a level below the eﬃcient one (Wolf 2002). In the present
study we use total trade (sum of exports and imports in national
currencies) in % of GDP6 as an indicator for economic openness to
examine whether such inﬂuences lead to convergence.
• Political orientation of the government (govleft): To some extent,
the ﬁnancing ratio is ﬁxed in a political decision process and there-
fore reﬂects the preferences of the political agents on public and
6This value does not change when export, import and GDP are expressed in real
values as the price level for these ﬁgures is the same (see http://pwt.econ.upenn.
edu/Documentation/append61.pdf, page 10).
8private HCF. We assume that left oriented governments favour pub-
lic HCF over private HCF. We include cabinet posts held by left
parties in percentage of total cabinet posts as an indicator for the
governments’ political orientation.
• Income (lngdpcap) as a driver of health care expenditures: Empir-
ical literature on the health expenditure/GDP-relationship widely
agrees that GDP per capita is one of the major drivers of health care
expenditures (see e.g. Okunade & Murthy 2002). This is not only
true for the overall health care expenditures but also for the two
components private and public ﬁnancing. But as Gouveia (1996)
and Clemente et al. (2004) demonstrate, the eﬀect of diﬀerences
in the level and growth of GDP per capita on the two components
might be diﬀerent, depending on the institutional design of the pub-
lic and private ﬁnancing scheme. In addition to this, preferences
for diﬀerent forms of risk coverage might change when income rises.
If we assume that the variety of health care packages is a superior
good we would expect that an increase in GDP will strengthen
the private health care provision (ﬁnancing). On the other hand,
the coverage of health care risks could be interpreted as a supe-
rior good and public coverage is an important – in some situations
preferable – option of protection. Consequently, we are not able
to conclude that the convergence in GDP per capita automatically
leads to a convergence in the ﬁnancing ratio. Information on in-
come is included in the form of logarithmic GDP per capita (in
US$ purchasing power parity).
• Type of the health care system (NHS): As already highlighted,
the institutional design of the health care system acts as a ‘ﬁlter’
which transforms external changes/shocks in the economic and de-
mographic surroundings into decisions and outcomes. The term
‘institutional design’ captures more than just budget constraints
and ﬁnancing schedules in a narrow economic sense (e.g. ‘culture’
of decision making and conﬂict resolution). We control for these
potential diﬀerences by separating the sample into three diﬀerent
country groups: countries which provide national health services
(NHS), countries with social health insurance (SHI), and others.
9• Country and time eﬀects: Country and time dummies are included
in the regression analysis to control for (i) overall country-speciﬁc
characteristics thereby also controlling for diﬀerences in the coun-
tries’ health care systems and (ii) time trends which cannot be
addressed speciﬁcally.
3.3.1 Data sources and sample design
Data employed for the analyses in the present paper are taken from two
data sources. Information regarding HCF (public, publicgdp, publiccov,
gdpcap, elderly) stems from the OECD health statistic database. This
source originally includes information on 30 countries with a time cov-
erage starting in the year 1960. Data referring to political variables are
available from the comparative political data set collected by the Uni-
versity of Bern.7 It reports political and institutional data on an annual
basis for 23 OECD countries for the period 1960 to 2005. Out of this
comprehensive set we use information on the openness of the economy
(openc) and the government’s political orientation (govleft). Our ﬁnal
data cover a period of 36 years (1970-2005) for which most of the rele-
vant variables are available. The remaining few gaps were completed by
inter- or extrapolation.
3.4 Econometric speciﬁcations
To test convergence in HCF we apply the concepts of σ-convergence as
well as absolute and conditional β-convergence.8 In particular, we exam-
ine the convergence in public ﬁnancing in % of total HCF (public) and
public ﬁnancing in % of GDP (publicgdp) towards their respective steady
state level using cross section and panel data analyses. We start with
analysing σ-convergence pictured by the coeﬃcient of variation (CV) and
its development over time. It is calculated from cross section information
by dividing a variable’s standard deviation σ by its mean µ where σ and
7http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_
political_data_sets/
8The latter concepts were developed within the framework of neoclassical growth
models to explain the convergence in aggregate output (see for example Barro & Sala-i
Martin (1992) for convergence in income per capita) and assume the existence of a
steady state in economic development.





The concept of β-convergence is the second convergence measure ap-
plied. In these regression analyses the focus is on examining whether a
series moves toward its mean over time. Barro & Sala-i Martin (1992)
show that the average growth rate (based on the neoclassical growth

















where x denotes the steady state growth rate and y∗ represents the steady
state of y. The base equation, we estimate in this paper, is a reformula-
tion of equation (2) and reads as
1
T
lnyiT = αi + β lnyi0 + i (3)
where y stands either for public or publicgdp, αi = xi + 1−e−bT
T lny∗
i, β
pictures the convergence coeﬃcient and consists of e−bT
T and  refers to
the error term. T indicates for how many years data are available, the
index 0 describes the initial period. i stands for country as the cross
sectional unit. Equation (3) examines convergence in the cross section.
If αi = α, i.e. the same for all countries, and β < 1, this implies that
countries unconditionally move toward a uniform steady state.9
In order to analyse convergence based on panel data we use an exten-
sion of equation (3) which applies for discrete periods:
lnyit = αi + β1 lnyit−1 + γzit + ηt + it (4)
with αi = xi + (1 − e−bT)lny∗
i and β = e−b. y again represents the de-
pendent variables public and publicgdp, respectively. The parameter αi
9Note, that our dependent variable refer to its quantity in period t (instead of its
growth). If we subtracted 1 from the parameter β we would get the corresponding
coeﬃcient if the growth rate were the dependent variable. The speed of convergence b
can be calculated from the regression coeﬃcient β on the initial level y0. For example,
for the speciﬁcation at hand, b = −
ln(Tβ)
T .
11introduces a shift which may be diﬀerent for each country, i.e. it allows
for a movement toward country speciﬁc means. Beside this ‘general’
country dummies, the lagged dependent variable y0 and time ﬁxed ef-
fects ηt we include speciﬁc country characteristics as further explanatory
variables z as discussed in Section 3.3.10 it is the disturbance term.
Before analysing convergence in public and publicgdp using panel data
we test for stationarity of the variables included. We apply the unit root
test developed by Levin, Lin & Chu (2002). For both dependent vari-
ables, lnpublic and lnpublicgdp, as well as the regressors we include a
constant and one lag of the corresponding variable in the regression. We
can reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity for both dependent
variables and the majority of independent variables at the 5 % signif-
icance level. Non-stationary variables are logarithmic GDP per capita
(lngdpcap) as well as a nation’s proportion of elderly people (elderly).
Hence, we include their ﬁrst diﬀerences (depicted by ∆) at the RHS so
that all regressors are consequently stationary. Equation (4) (as well as
(3)) implies that the convergence parameter β and, hence, the speed of
convergence b does not vary across countries. We relax this assumption
and test for potential diﬀerences in convergence patterns by running sep-
arate regressions for particular subgroups classiﬁed through (i) a coun-
try’s health care system and (ii) speciﬁc time periods. For convergence
to occur, β has to be signiﬁcantly lower than one.11
In the sensitivity analysis we interact β with country dummies. The
interaction of the convergence coeﬃcient with country dummies enables
us not only to control for diﬀerent steady state levels across countries
(captured by the country dummies) but also to examine whether the
countries’ rates of convergence diﬀer statistically from each other (diﬀer-
ent slope parameters).
10One may doubt the exogeneity of the explanatory variables included. Although
public HCF may shape the regressors used such inﬂuences do not occur contempo-
raneously. Rather, it is adequate to assume that the eﬀects of public HCF on the
regressors occur with some time lags meaning that today’s HCF inﬂuences tomorrow’s
insurance coverage, proportion of elderly, GDP, ...but not today’s levels.
11If β = 1, the series follows a random walk.
124 Results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the variables included in the ﬁnal
data set.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Dependent variable
Public ﬁnancinga) 828 74.76 12.32 36.30 98.30
Public ﬁnancingb) 828 5.51 1.36 1.48 8.95
Independent variables
Public health insurance coveragec) 809 94.46 14.07 22.00 100.00
Population > 65c) 828 13.34 2.46 7.10 20.20
Total tradeb) 805 68.31 42.27 11.25 288.74
Cabinet posts of left partiesd) 828 33.91 37.86 0.00 100.00
GDP per capitae) 803 16.35 9.49 1.91 53.55
Notes: a) in % of total HCF, b) in % of GDP, c) in % of total population, d) in %
of total posts, e) in thousand US $ PPP.
On average, public ﬁnancing in % of total HCF (public) accounts
for three-quarter of HCF. Public ﬁnancing in % of GDP (publicgdp)
amounts to 5.5 % on average. The mean of public health insurance
coverage indicates that a high proportion – 94 % – has public health
coverage. 13.3 % of the countries’ population is older than 65. The
economic indicators show an average GDP per capita of about 16,000
US$ and a trade volume of 68 % of GDP. Social democrats and other left
parties on average hold about one third of the available cabinet posts.
Figure A1 in the Appendix depicts the average share of public ﬁnanc-
ing for the total sample as well as for two sub groups. The sub groups
consist of 14 countries which run a National Health Service (NHS) and
7 countries characterized by Social Health Insurance (SHI).12 Public ﬁ-
nancing considering the total sample starts at a value of 72.1 % in 1970
12 NHS countries are Australia, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy,
Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Spain and United Kingdom. Aus-
tria, Belgium, Germany, France, Japan, Luxembourg and the Netherlands represent
the group of SHI countries. Switzerland and the United States together form the
group ‘Others’ as they can neither be classiﬁed as NHS nor as SHI countries.
13and ends with an average of 74.6 % in 2005. The minimum (maximum)
appears in 1971 (1979) and amounts to 71.6 % (77.5 %). The series
reveals similar patterns for NHS and SHI countries with a minimum of
73.3 % in 1971 and a peak at 80.6 % in 1979 in the NHS group and
corresponding values of 74.1 % in 1971 and 80.9 % in 1993 for the SHI
countries.13
The temporal development of public ﬁnancing in % of GDP (publicgdp)
is shown in Figure A2. The initial values are around 3.8 % for the total
sample (which again includes Switzerland and the USA) as well as for
the NHS and SHI group, respectively. publicgdp increases over the years
and ranges between 6.8 % (NHS countries) and 7.5 % (SHI countries) in
the year 2005.
Figures A3 and A4 in the Appendix provide a ﬁrst answer to the
question whether convergence is observable regarding the level of public
and publicgdp (β-convergence). Figure A3 (Figure A4) depict the coun-
tries’ average annual growth rate of public (publicgdp) in % on the y-axis
and its initial value on the x-axis. The data points indicate a negative
relationship between growth and initial level. In other words, countries
with initially low levels of public and publicgdp, respectively, grow faster
than countries with high initial values implying that the countries ﬁnally
converge to each other.
4.2 Empirical Estimates
This section presents the outcome of the analysis described in Section
3.4. We examine σ-convergence (measured as CV according to equation
(1)) for the total sample and for the NHS and SHI sub samples using
public and publicgdp. Figures 1 and 2 graphically picture the trend of
the CV.14 Table 2 presents the annual average growth in σ-convergence
for both series and diﬀerent time periods.
13In order to improve clarity we forgo plotting public for the third group, consisting
of Switzerland and the United States. The corresponding values are signiﬁcantly
lower at each point in time. The minimum (maximum) is 44.9 % (55.2 %) in 1988
(1983). The line in Figure A1 referring to the total sample includes these values. This
explains why the curve picturing the total sample always runs below the curves for
the two other sub samples.
14As before, we do not plot the values for Switzerland and the USA for clarity
reasons but their values are included in the plot representing the total sample.
14For the total sample, the CV decreases from 0.200 to 0.135 (Figure
1) and from 0.315 to 0.116 (Figure 2), respectively. The annual average
growth in σ-convergence amounts to 1.1 % for public and to 2.7 % in case
of publicgdp. However, the relative dispersion diﬀers across time periods.
While the CV in the periods 1970-1979 and 1990-2005 is quite similar
within the series, the ﬁgures indicate no convergence for public during
the years 1980-1989 and a dampened divergence pattern for publicgdp.
All in all, these results conﬁrm that the public HCF has converged in the
period 1970-2005 and that convergence is more pronounced for publicgdp
than for public.
Figure 1: Coeﬃcient of variation – public ﬁnancing in % of total HCF
Distinguishing between NHS and SHI countries we ﬁnd that with
respect to public the CV is considerably higher for NHS than for SHI
countries in the year 1970 (0.193 vs. 0.133) but the two CV approach
each other over time. In 2005, the CV amounts to 0.092 (NHS) and 0.104
(SHI), respectively (see Figure 1). This trend is pictured in the negative
annual average growth in σ-convergence, indicating a more distinctive
convergence pattern for NHS than for SHI countries (see column (3) in
Table 2). In the NHS sub sample convergence mainly arise in the periods
1970-1979 and 1990-2005 while dispersion during 1980-1989 – and for SHI
countries in 1990-2005 – is very moderate.
15Figure 2: Coeﬃcient of variation – public ﬁnancing in % of GDP
Table 2: Annual average growth in σ-convergence
Public ﬁnancing
in % of total HCF in % of GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Period All NHS SHI All NHS SHI
1970-2005 −1.08% −1.93% −0.33% −2.67% −3.12% −0.91%
1970-1979 −1.73% −2.89% −1.94% −3.08% −3.10% −5.34%
1980-1989 0.58% 0.00% 0.28% −1.07% −1.12% 1.52%
1990-2005 −1.76% −2.60% 0.21% −3.45% −4.38% 0.05%
Notes: σ-convergence refers to the coeﬃcient of variation.
Similar patterns – diﬀerent CV for NHS and SHI countries in the ini-
tial period which approach over the years – are observable with respect
to publicgdp (Figure 2). For NHS (SHI) countries, CV falls from 0.363
(0.213) in 1970 to 0.106 (0.132) in 2005 which indicates a higher conver-
gence pattern for NHS than for SHI countries (see columns (5) and (6) in
Table 2). While for NHS countries the relative dispersion is largest in the
periods 1970-1979 (change of 3.1 %) and 1990-2005 (4.4 % change), for
16SHI countries convergence mainly occurs during the initial years where
the annual average change in σ-convergence amounts to 5.3 %.
To summarize our results with respect to σ-convergence: For both
series, public and publicgdp, we observe declining patterns (although not
monotonically declining) in CV which indicate that the variation across
countries decreases over time. However, convergence patterns diﬀer be-
tween diﬀerent time periods and health care systems: While convergence
is strongly inﬂuenced by the tendencies in the periods 1970-1979 and
1990-1995, relative dispersion is moderate within the years 1980-1989.
Furthermore, convergence patterns are more pronounced within NHS
than SHI countries.
Our ﬁrst set of regression estimates refers to the concept of absolute
convergence using cross section data. Due to the small sample size at this
level we desist from running separate calculations for each sub sample
and from investigating conditional convergence. However, for both of our
dependent variables (log values), lnpublic and lnpublicgdp, we conduct
regressions for the whole time span 1970-2005 as well as for smaller time
segments to test whether the coeﬃcients on the initial values vary among
time. The estimates given in column (1) in Tables 3 and 4 cover 36 years,
columns (2), (3), (4) refer to the periods 1970-1979, 1980-1989 and 1990-
2005, respectively. Except for lnpublicgdp referring to the whole period
the coeﬃcients associated with the initial values of each time period
always reveal a signiﬁcant impact. The coeﬃcients describe that the
lower a country’s initial share of public ﬁnancing – measured via public
ﬁnancing in % of total HCF or in % of GDP – is the more pronounced
the corresponding growth. This means that countries with low initial
values catch up in terms of public ﬁnancing.
The following estimates take advantage of the panel structure of the
data and are based on the least square dummy variable (LSDV) estima-
tor. This enables us to control for country and time eﬀects by including
country and time dummies. In addition to the lagged dependent vari-
able, the country and time dummies we introduce further explanatory
variables to examine whether speciﬁc diﬀerences across countries induce
a movement to a country’s own steady state which is known as condi-
tional convergence (see equation (4)). We conduct separate regressions
for the NHS and SHI countries as well as for three diﬀerent time peri-
17Table 3: Absolute β convergence in lnpublic - cross section analysis
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)







Obs. 23 23 23 23
Adj. R2 0.65 0.89 0.84 0.81
Notes: Constant not reported. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. ∗∗∗ indicate the 1% level of signiﬁcance.
Table 4: Absolute β convergence in lnpublicgdp - cross section analysis
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)







Obs 23 23 23 23
Adj. R2 0.06 0.75 0.63 0.32
Notes: Constant not reported. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. ∗∗∗ indicate the 1% level of signiﬁcance.
ods, 1970-1979, 1980-1989 and 1990-2005, respectively. Table 5 shows
the results for lnpublic, Table 6 presents the estimates for lnpublicgdp.
For both speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcients on the lagged dependent vari-
ables are always signiﬁcantly (at a 1 % signiﬁcance level) smaller than
1 implying that countries with low initial public ﬁnancing move faster
towards their respective steady state. The estimates in Table 5 indicate
that convergence between the countries in the total sample as well as the
NHS and SHI countries occurs (columns 1-3). The hypothesis that β1
18(the coeﬃcient on the lagged dependent variable) is equal between the
NHS and SHI countries cannot be rejected. For the total sample as well
as the subgroups of NHS and SHI countries the F-test indicates no sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerence meaning that within these groups there is convergence
towards the same level of public ﬁnancing. The country dummies given
in columns 4-6 of Table 5 depict that country speciﬁc diﬀerences also
play a role over time. These estimates additionally reveal that the rate
of convergence15 decreases over time as it is expected.16 The explanatory
variables included indicate that a country’s public health insurance cov-
erage publiccov, the openness of its economy openc and the governmental
political orientation govleft may induce a movement towards a country
speciﬁc mean.
Regarding public ﬁnancing in % of GDP lnpublicgdp the country
dummies are jointly signiﬁcant in each sub group and time period (except
for 1980-1989) but the H0-hypothesis that the rate of convergence is
equal for the NHS and SI countries cannot be rejected (see Table 6).
The explanatory variables included provide evidence that the change in
a country’s demographic burden ∆elderly, the openness of an economy
openc and the change in GDP ∆lngdpcap are major characteristics which
promote country speciﬁc means. As before, the temporal split shows
that the rate of convergence (comprised in lnpublicgdpt−1) decreases over
time.
The results given in the Tables 5 and 6 are in line with the ﬁndings
of the graphical and cross section analyses as they indicate convergence
in public ﬁnancing in % of total HCF and public ﬁnancing in % of GDP,
respectively.
4.2.1 Robustness analysis
Nerlove (1971) and Nickell (1981) point at the bias of the ﬁxed eﬀects
estimator when the lagged dependent variable is included in the RHS
of the equation. However, this dynamic panel bias is declining with an
increasing number of time periods. Analogous to our estimates shown in
Tables 5 and 6 we calculate bias corrected LSDV estimators as suggested
by Kiviet (1995) to check the robustness of our results (see Tables A1
15For the panel speciﬁcation, the rate of convergence is given by b1 = −(lnβ).
16This pattern still holds when we keep the number of observations constant.
19Table 5: Conditional β convergence in lnpublic - panel data
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All NHS SHI 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-2005
lnpublict−1 0.846∗∗∗ 0.828∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗ 0.663∗∗∗ 0.795∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.043) (0.046) (0.107) (0.099) (0.065)
publiccov −0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.001 −0.000 −0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
∆elderly 0.011 0.011 0.019 −0.016 0.017 0.010
(0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.042) (0.014) (0.008)
openc −0.000 0.000 −0.001∗∗ −0.001 −0.001 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
govleft 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗ −0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆lngdpcap 0.007 0.051 −0.101 −0.084 0.045 0.046
(0.054) (0.067) (0.085) (0.153) (0.129) (0.059)
Obs. 740 476 213 189 213 338
Adj. R2 0.97 0.96 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.98
F-tests
Country eﬀects 1.38 1.50 1.51 2.63∗∗∗ 1.69∗∗ 1.53∗
Time eﬀects 1.26 1.16 0.74 3.10∗∗∗ 1.19 1.63∗
β1 = 1 26.32∗∗∗ 16.34∗∗∗ 13.43∗∗∗ 30.06∗∗∗ 11.63∗∗∗ 9.76∗∗∗
χ2-test
Equal β1 0.01
Notes: Constant, country and time eﬀects not reported. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% level of signiﬁcance.
and A2 in the Appendix). Particularly for the estimates including all
observations these corrected estimates do not considerably diverge from
our previous estimates due to the broad time coverage (36 years) of the
data applied. However, for the shorter time periods the Kiviet estimates
demonstrate that the bias becomes more pronounced with decreasing
time coverage. Regarding the declining tendency of the rate of conver-
gence over time LSDV estimates and the Kiviet correction show similar
patterns and, hence, support our ﬁndings discussed above.
By running separate regressions for NHS and SHI we examined whether
these groups signiﬁcantly diﬀer in their rate of convergence (see Section
4.2). Although we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences across these samples
(the hypothesis of an equal β across NHS and SHI countries cannot be
20Table 6: Conditional β convergence in lnpublicgdp - panel data
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All NHS SHI 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-2005
lnpublicgdpt−1 0.852∗∗∗ 0.849∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗ 0.716∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.028) (0.044) (0.061) (0.076) (0.040)
publiccov −0.000 0.000 0.002 −0.000 0.001 0.007∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
∆elderly 0.029∗∗ 0.023∗ 0.057∗ −0.102 0.029 0.039∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.029) (0.078) (0.022) (0.017)
openc −0.000∗ −0.001∗∗ 0.000 −0.002 −0.001 −0.001∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
govleft 0.000 0.000∗ −0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆lngdpcap −0.483∗∗∗−0.544∗∗∗−0.307 −0.663∗∗∗ −0.505∗∗ −0.426∗∗
(0.111) (0.108) (0.201) (0.195) (0.220) (0.173)
Obs. 740 476 213 189 213 338
Adj. R2 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96
F-tests
Country eﬀects 2.14∗∗∗ 2.29∗∗ 2.06∗ 3.83∗∗∗ 1.54∗ 2.07∗∗∗
Time eﬀects 5.67∗∗∗ 4.08∗∗∗ 2.75∗∗∗ 10.66∗∗∗ 1.48 5.68∗∗∗
β1 = 1 48.18∗∗∗ 29.87∗∗∗ 17.50∗∗∗ 41.75∗∗∗ 13.97∗∗∗ 30.22∗∗∗
χ2-test
Equal β1 0.54
Notes: Constant, country and time eﬀects not reported. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% level of signiﬁcance.
rejected), variations may occur considering even smaller entities. There-
fore, we (i) further split the NHS countries into old and new NHS coun-
tries17 and (ii) introduce interaction terms with the lagged dependent
variable and all country dummies as suggested by Nixon (1999).
Columns (1) and (2) of Table A3 in the Appendix show the results
for public ﬁnancing in % of total HCF lnpublic using the NHS sample
only. A χ2-test reveals that the rate of convergence is signiﬁcantly higher
in old comparing to new NHS countries. However, when we introduce
17We classify those countries as old NHS countries which were already NHS-systems
at the beginning of the observation period (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Great
Britain, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden). Countries, which
changed to a NHS-system during the past 36 years are deﬁned as new NHS countries
(Greece in 1983, Italy in 1978, Portugal in 1979, Spain in 1987).
21the interaction of the convergence parameter with each country dummy
(column(3)) and test whether the corresponding coeﬃcients are jointly
signiﬁcant we cannot reject the H0 hypothesis of jointly insigniﬁcant slope
diﬀerences. Testing whether β1 = 1 reveals that the H0 cannot be rejected
anymore for the total sample. This means that the series in this sample
follows a random walk without any convergence/divergence patterns.
Columns (4) to (6) of Table A3 depict the results for public ﬁnancing
in % of GDP lnpublicgdp. Here, we cannot reject the H0 hypothesis of
equal βs for the old and new NHS countries (see columns (4) and (5)).
The country dummies in these two sub samples indicate that new NHS
countries do not move towards a common mean. But for old NHS states
a development towards a country speciﬁc level is observable. Further-
more, when we allow for diﬀerent slope parameters for each country by
including interactions we ﬁnd evidence that the slopes and hence, the
rate of convergence, is country speciﬁc too (column(6)).
5 Conclusions and suggestions for future
research
Convergence in the health care ﬁnancing is one source to promote work-
ers’ mobility, to harmonize policies and to boost cross border shopping
within the health care sector. Hence, we are interested in learning about
the corresponding convergence patterns. The analysis in this paper refers
to the question whether the ﬁnancing structure (public-private ﬁnancing
mix) of the health care systems in 23 OECD countries converges. To an-
swer this research question we focus on the public ﬁnancing ratio which
we measure by two variables: public ﬁnancing in % of total health care
ﬁnancing (HCF) and public ﬁnancing in % of GDP.
Beside the focus of the hitherto disregarded ﬁnancing side this paper
contributes to the existing literature by providing a long-run perspective
(36 years) of convergence patterns using a broad sample of 23 OECD
countries. σ-convergence (measured as coeﬃcient of variation), absolute
and conditional β-convergence are used to examine whether public ﬁ-
nancing converges. We split this sample into sub groups to test whether
diﬀerent developments occur across the health care systems (NHS vs.
22SHI) and time segments (1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-2005). Country
speciﬁc characteristics are captured by dummy variables for each coun-
try as well as information on a country’s public health insurance coverage,
proportion of a country’s population older than 65 years, openness of the
economy, political orientation of the government and GDP per capita.
Our major ﬁnding is that convergence takes place. This conclusion
is independent from the speciﬁcation of the dependent variable (public
ﬁnancing in % of total HCF as well as in % of GDP), the diﬀerent meth-
ods of testing for convergence (σ-convergence, absolute and conditional
β-convergence) and the diﬀerent assignments of countries to sub sam-
ples (NHS and SHI states). However, in both series country dummies
included indicate a movement towards a diﬀerent mean although this
eﬀect is not euqally pronounced for each dependent variable across the
sub groups. Variations across sub samples also occur with respect to
the rate of convergence. Separating the sample into NHS and SHI coun-
tries reveals that these two sub groups do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer in their
rate of convergence. When we focus on a smaller sub sample of NHS
countries (old and new NHS countries) we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence for
the convergence coeﬃcient regarding public ﬁnancing in % of total HCF.
Splitting the observation period into three time segments highlights that
the rate of convergence is decreasing over time.
Our tests show that the characteristics we used to control for condi-
tional convergence are only partially signiﬁcant while the country ﬁxed
eﬀects are of higher relevance. This is in line with our theoretical reason-
ing and an indication for the signiﬁcance of those parts of the institutional
design of the health care system, we were not able to control for explicitly.
However, the change in the level and share of public ﬁnancing only
gives a ﬁrst impression of the convergence issue in health care ﬁnancing.
For a deeper understanding of the determinants and eﬀects of convergence
we have to consider how the relationship between public and private ﬁ-
nancing is structured in detail. There exist at least ﬁve basic designs of
this relationship: (i) Parallel public and private ﬁnancing systems: for a
given range of services a separate privately ﬁnanced system exists as an
alternative to public ﬁnancing. (ii) Co-payment: Across a broad range of
services, ﬁnancing is partially subsidized through public payment, with
the remainder ﬁnanced through out-of-pocket (OOP) payment or private
23health insurance. The degree of co-payment can follow diﬀerent schedules
and may be scaled according to the income and/or other individual char-
acteristics of the patient. (iii) Group-based: Certain population groups
are eligible for public coverage, others rely on private health insurance
or are free to choose private options. (iv) Sectoral: Certain health care
sectors are entirely ﬁnanced publicly (e.g. inpatient care) while others
mainly rely upon private ﬁnance (e.g. pharmaceuticals). (v) In addition
to the diﬀerences in the private-public relationship the internal structure
of public (tax and/or SHI) and private (private health insurance and/or
OOP) seems to be important.
In a nutshell this means that the same levels or shares of public ﬁ-
nancing we observe in reality are compatible with diﬀerent links in the
designs (i) to (v).The approaches to explain the public-private ﬁnanc-
ing structure oﬀered so far (see Gouveia 1996, Clemente et al. 2004) do
not account for this institutional diversity. E. g., in the Gouvea-Model
the private sector only acts as a complement to an obligatory publicly
ﬁnanced health care sector and only consists of private health insurance.
OOP payments which account for a substantial part of private health
care ﬁnancing in reality are not included in their political economic per-
spective.
We are convinced that deeper insights into the convergence issue could
be derived by studying the ﬁnancing structure in more detail. On the
one hand, this means splitting up public/private ﬁnancing into its most
important building blocks. On the other hand, it seems to be promising
to take a closer look at the ﬁnancing structure in the diﬀerent sectors of
health care provision such as outpatient care, inpatient care and phar-
maceuticals.
This detailed analysis of the ﬁnancing structure requires disaggre-
gated data about HCF (public-private relationships). No reliable data
on the dimensions mentioned are available for the time period 1970 –
2005. Information on a very limited sample of OECD-countries exists
only since 1990. However, a disaggregated study needs to be on future
research agendas to capture and understand the ongoing processes in
HCF in their complexity.
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Figure A1: Average public ﬁnancing in % of total HCF
Figure A2: Average public ﬁnancing in % of GDP
29Figure A3: Average growth rate of public ﬁnancing in % of total HCF
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30Table A1: Conditional β convergence in lnpublic - Kiviet correction
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All NHS SHI 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-2005
lnpublict−1 0.894∗∗∗ 0.877∗∗∗ 0.887∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ 0.830∗∗∗ 0.922∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.025) (0.034) (0.063) (0.060) (0.055)
publiccov −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
∆elderly 0.010 0.011∗ 0.019∗∗ −0.025 0.003 0.009
(0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.036) (0.025) (0.007)
openc 0.000 0.000 −0.000∗∗ −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
govleft 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ −0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆lngdpcap 0.015 0.062 −0.103 −0.080 −0.008 0.050
(0.056) (0.039) (0.078) (0.072) (0.123) (0.059)
Obs. 740 476 213 189 213 338
Notes: Constant and time eﬀects not reported. Bootstrap standard errors in
parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% level of signiﬁcance.
Table A2: Conditional β convergence in lnpublicgdp - Kiviet correction
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All NHS SHI 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-2005
lnpublicgdpt−1 0.892∗∗∗ 0.889∗∗∗ 0.859∗∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗ 0.886∗∗∗ 0.869∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.021) (0.038) (0.053) (0.076) (0.035)
publiccov −0.001 −0.000 0.000 −0.001 −0.002 0.006
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
∆elderly 0.026∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗ 0.012 0.035∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.010) (0.015) (0.052) (0.031) (0.011)
openc −0.000∗∗ −0.000 0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
govleft 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ −0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆lngdpcap −0.472∗∗∗−0.539∗∗∗−0.294∗∗ −0.677∗∗∗ −0.491∗∗∗ −0.433∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.061) (0.118) (0.126) (0.149) (0.102)
Obs. 740 476 213 189 213 338
Notes: Constant and time eﬀects not reported. Bootstrap standard errors in
parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% level of signiﬁcance.
31Table A3: Conditional β convergence in lnpublic and lnpublicgdp –
panel data
Public ﬁnancing
in % of total HCF in % of GDP
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
newNHS oldNHS All newNHS oldNHS All
lnpublict−1 0.867∗∗∗ 0.734∗∗∗ 0.939∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.068) (0.096)
lnpublicgdpt−1 0.874∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.030) (0.056)
publiccov −0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
∆elderly 0.018 −0.011 0.012 0.028 −0.015 0.037∗∗
(0.016) (0.014) (0.009) (0.020) (0.023) (0.014)
openc 0.001 0.000 −0.000 0.000 −0.001 −0.001∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
govleft 0.000∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆lngdpcap 0.067 −0.034 −0.011 −0.491∗∗ −0.686∗∗∗ −0.491∗∗∗
(0.172) (0.063) (0.057) (0.243) (0.101) (0.115)
Obs. 136 340 740 136 340 740
Adj. R2 0.95 0.94 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.97
F-tests
Country eﬀects 1.41 1.78∗ 0.96 1.68 3.74∗∗∗ 2.72∗∗∗
Time eﬀects 1.14∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗ 1.16 1.44∗ 4.15∗∗∗ 5.92∗∗∗
β1 = 1 5.09∗∗ 15.33∗∗∗ 0.41 6.28∗∗ 39.08∗∗∗ 12.57∗∗∗
Slopes = 0 0.95 3.08∗∗∗
χ2-test
Equal β1 2.80∗ 1.52
Notes: Constant, country and time eﬀects not reported. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% level of signiﬁcance.
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